Why didn’t the USSR Enter into an Alliance Agreement with Britain and France Before World War II?
Table of contents:
Preface
1. The First Phase of the Negotiation Process
2. The Military Negotiations
3. Anglo-French negotiations with Nazi Germany
Conclusion
Note
Preface
The modern anti-Russian political rhetoric of the European Union seeks to equate the USSR with Nazi Germany and openly declares the allegedly equal responsibility of both countries for unleashing the Second World War. Today, rabid anti-Russian / anti-Soviet propaganda, grossly distorting and hushing up historical facts, is more and more imposing on people the thesis that the Soviet and Nazi regimes were close ideologically and politically.
This trend is aimed at creating the image of an absolute villain in the face of the USSR (and along with modern Russia). This turns reality upside down, because in reality the USSR had an ideology diametrically opposed to Nazism, it became a victim of an attack by Germany, which practiced genocide of the Soviet people and planned to destroy the USSR (and Russia) as a state, and Russians as a great nation. The Soviet Union suffered huge human and material losses in this war, it bore the brunt of the fight, making a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazism.
The USSR, in particular, is unfairly reproached for the fact that before the war, he chose to conclude an “alliance” with Hitler instead of an alliance with Britain, France and the United States. In fact, the USSR did not have an alliance treaty with Germany: a non-aggression pact was concluded (it was no worse than similar treaties between Germany and Poland, Britain, France, Romania, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia and was the last in this row). On the contrary, the USSR tried to conclude a military treaty with Britain and France, but was faced with insufficient interest of the latters.
This article highlights the tripartite anti-German negotiations, the motives and specific actions of the parties.
1. The First Phase of the Negotiation Process
The decision to negotiate with the Western powers was a continuation of the consistent foreign policy of the Soviet state to create a system of collective security, suppress fascist expansion and prevent war.
The international situation and the internal political situation of the Western powers created certain preconditions for the success of such negotiations. The «appeasement» policy did not bring England and France the desired results: it became increasingly clear that they, and not the USSR, could be the first to face Nazi aggression.
The Anglo-French public persistently advocated negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the spring of 1939, such sentiments gripped a significant part of the members of the British Parliament. An alliance with the USSR was advocated not only by Labor and Liberals, but also by many conservatives who hated the USSR and at the same time feared for the fate of the British Empire. “We will be in mortal danger,” Churchill said in the House of Commons, “if we cannot create a great alliance against aggression. It would be the greatest folly if we rejected natural cooperation with Soviet Russia” (Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. 1939. Vol. 345, col. 2507–2508, 2516). Liberal leader Lloyd George warned Chamberlain: “Acting without Russia’s help, we will fall into a trap.”
However, the “appeasers” tried to play for time. They hoped that the fear of an alliance between Britain and France with the USSR would force Germany to come to an agreement with the Western powers and return its policy to the framework of the Munich agreement.
On March 21, the British Ambassador to the USSR Seeds handed over to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs the following draft declaration of England, the USSR, France and Poland: “We, the undersigned, duly authorized thereto, hereby declare that since peace and security in Europe are a matter of common interests and concerns and since European peace and security may be affected by any action constituting a threat to the political independence of any European state, our respective governments hereby undertake to immediately consult on the steps to be taken to jointly resist to such actions.” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971.С. 265).
The limitation of this draft declaration, which replaced concrete decisive action against the aggressors with the obligation to “consult immediately,” was obvious. Nevertheless, believing that even such a declaration could play a positive role, the Soviet government agreed with it. The USSR People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs told Seeds: “We agree with the position of the British government and accept the wording of its draft declaration. The representatives of the Soviet government will immediately sign the declaration as soon as France and Poland accept the British proposal and promise their signatures. To give the act a special solemnity and obligation, we propose to sign the Prime Ministers and Foreign Ministers of all four states” (Ibid.). In order to make the British project more effective, the Soviet government expressed a wish that Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, and also the Scandinavian countries should join the declaration along with the Balkan countries (Ibid.).
Despite this, the British government rejected its own proposal of March 21, 1939. Moreover, it continued to connive at the aggressor. “When I occupied Memel,” Hitler later testified, “Chamberlain informed me through third parties that he understood very well the need to take such a step, although he could not publicly approve such a step” (J. Kimche. The Unfought Battle. — London: Cox Saud Wyman Ltd., 1968).
In mid-April, Britain and France sent new proposals to the Soviet Union. French Foreign Minister Bonnet declared his readiness to exchange letters with the USSR obliging the parties to mutual support if one of them is drawn into the war with Germany as a result of providing assistance to Poland or Romania. The essence of the British proposal was that the USSR should undertake unilateral obligations to help “its European neighbors” in the event of aggression against them. The French proposal, despite its limitations, contained an element of reciprocity, which was not in the English, according to which the Soviet Union was to immediately enter the war with Germany on the side of “its European neighbors” without any specific reciprocal commitments of the British government.
Despite the clearly two-faced position of Great Britain, the Soviet government in every possible way tried to solve in a businesslike way, together with France and Britain, the problem of repelling German aggression. On April 17, it brought up for discussion, suggestions which marked the beginning of real negotiations. These suggestions were as follows:
«1. England, France, the USSR conclude an agreement between themselves for a period of 5–10 years on a mutual obligation to provide each other immediately with all kinds of assistance, including military, in the event of aggression in Europe against any of the contracting states.
2. England, France, the USSR undertake to provide all kinds of assistance, including military, to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas and bordering the USSR in the event of aggression against these states.
3. England, France and the USSR undertake as soon as possible to discuss and establish the size and form of military assistance rendered by each of these states in pursuance of § 1 and 2.
4. The British government explains that the assistance it promised to Poland means aggression exclusively from Germany.
5. The union treaty existing between Poland and Romania is declared valid in the event of any aggression against Poland and Romania, or it is completely canceled, as directed against the USSR.
6. England, France and the USSR undertake, after the opening of hostilities, not to enter into any kind of negotiations and not to conclude peace with the aggressors separately from each other and without a common agreement of all three powers.
7. The corresponding agreement is signed simultaneously with the convention, which has to be developed by virtue of § 3.
8. To recognize it necessary for England, France and the USSR to enter into joint negotiations with Turkey on a special agreement on mutual assistance” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 336–337).
It was a solid foundation for a tripartite mutual assistance treaty based on equality of obligations and the necessary effectiveness of measures to suppress aggression in any region of Europe.
But the reciprocity of obligations did not suit England and France. They counted only on such an agreement that would allow the USSR to be drawn into the war with Germany and at the same time avoid rendering assistance to it. This was confirmed by the reciprocal proposals of France (April 25, 1939) and especially England (May 8, 1939).
At first glance, the French side declared the reciprocity of obligations: “If France and Great Britain were at war with Germany as a result of fulfilling the obligations that they would undertake in order to prevent any violent changes in the situation in Central or Eastern Europe, the USSR would them immediately help and support. If, as a result of the assistance provided by the USSR to France and Great Britain under the conditions stipulated in the previous paragraph, the USSR would, in turn, find itself in a state of war with Germany, France and Great Britain would immediately render assistance and support to it” (Ibid, p. 348–349).
However, this draft essentially rejected very important components of the Soviet proposals. His “reciprocity” was very relative. If the USSR was obliged to help France and England in any case of their war with Germany (even if they themselves start it), then support to the Soviet Union was provided only after it provided assistance to England and France. When the Soviet plenipotentiary envoy to France drew Bonnet’s attention to this, the latter, feigning embarrassment, said that, due to his excessive employment, he had assigned the draft editorial office to the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Léger (М. Панкратова, В. Сиполс. Почему не удалось предотвратить войну. Московские переговоры СССР, Англии и Франции 1939 года (Документальный обзор). Москва, 1970. С. 33).
After a long silence, the British government rejected the French proposals and introduced its own, with which it again tried to impose on the Soviet state obligations of unilateral and gratuitous aid to the Western powers.
In response, the Soviet government, in a memorandum dated May 14, 1939, informed Great Britain that the British proposals could not serve as a basis for organizing a front of resistance of peace-loving states to the further deployment of aggression in Europe, since they “do not contain the principle of reciprocity in relation to the USSR and put it into an unequal position…” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 395).
Trying to come to an agreement with the Western powers, the Soviet government put forward the following conditions for ensuring collective security in accordance with the principle of reciprocity:
«1. The conclusion between Britain, France and the USSR of an effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression;
2. These three great powers guarantee [of security] of the states of Central and Eastern Europe under the threat of aggression, including here also Latvia, Estonia, Finland;
3. The conclusion of a specific agreement between Britain, France and the USSR on the forms and amounts of assistance provided to each other and to the guaranteed states, without which (without such an agreement) mutual assistance pacts risk hanging in the air, as the experience of Czechoslovakia showed” (Ibid.).
The position of the USSR was impeccably frank and consistent. It was aimed at curbing the fascist aggressor, at ensuring collective security. But Anglo-French diplomacy in negotiations with the Soviet Union showed stubborn sluggishness, which, naturally, caused alarm in the international community.
In mid-May, the pressure of the more far-sighted members of the British Parliament on the Chamberlain government intensified. In response to insistent demands to speed up the negotiations in Moscow, Chamberlain said: “I must be careful and not allow anything that could complicate the situation … We have to turn to more than the Russian government alone. We must also bear in mind the governments of other countries.” This statement showed that the British policy of conniving at the aggressor remained unchanged.
Meanwhile, the political situation in Europe became more and more aggravated. Under pressure from public opinion, the Anglo-French side at the end of May was forced to somewhat change its position. In the proposals of May 27, the Western powers have already recognized the need for mutual assistance between Britain, France and the USSR in the event of a direct German attack. But reservations nullified this principle of mutual assistance. Instead of immediate measures against the aggressor, preliminary consultations and a solution to the issue in the League of Nations were proposed, which could be used as a trick to refuse immediate assistance to the victim of aggression.
The Soviet Union did not at all occupy the position of “overthrower” the initiative of the Western powers, as some Western historians are now trying to present. Taking all measures to speed up the course of negotiations and conclude an effective and equal treaty with Britain and France against aggression in Europe, the Soviet government on June 2, 1939 submitted to the respective governments a draft treaty on mutual assistance, which contained the following obligations of the parties:
«1
France, Britain and the USSR undertake to provide each other with immediate, comprehensive, effective assistance if one of these states is drawn into hostilities with a European power as a result of
1) aggression by this power against any of these three states either
2) aggression on the part of this power against Belgium, Greece, Turkey, Romania, Poland, Latvia, Estonia, Finland, regarding which it was agreed between England, France and the USSR that they undertake to defend these countries against aggression either
3) as a result of assistance provided by one of these three states to another European state that has requested this assistance in order to counter the violation of its neutrality.
2
The three states will agree as soon as possible on the methods, forms and amounts of assistance to be provided by them on the basis of Art. 1.
3
In the event that circumstances occur that create, in the opinion of one of the contracting parties, a threat of aggression from any European power, the three states will immediately begin consultations in order to study the situation and, if necessary, jointly establish the moment of immediate activation of the mutual assistance mechanism and the procedure for its application, regardless of any procedure for passing questions in the League of Nations.
4
The three states communicate to each other the texts of all their obligations in the spirit of the obligations provided for in Art. 1, in relation to European states. If one of them would envisage in the future the possibility of accepting new obligations of the same nature, it will first consult with two other states and inform them of the content (text) of the adopted agreement.
5
The three states undertake, in case of opening joint actions against aggression on the basis of Art. 1, to conclude a truce or peace only by joint agreement” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 432–433).
This project was based on the proposals previously put forward by the Soviet government and fully met the interests of the fight against aggression.
Chamberlain and Daladier, although they did not formally reject the Soviet project, nevertheless continued the tactic of delay. It was a demonstratively disrespectful act towards the USSR that the negotiations on the part of Great Britain were conducted by an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, W. Strang. Even Western historians qualify his arrival in Moscow as “a triple insult inflicted on the Soviet Union, for Strang was a person of low diplomatic rank, acted as a defender of a group of British engineers accused of espionage in Soviet Russia, and was part of a group of officers who accompanied Chamberlain to Munich” (D. Fleming. The Cold War and its Origins 1917–1960. Vol. I. New York, 1961. P. 91). Noting Strang’s adherence to the idea of pushing German aggression to the East, London aptly spoke at his address: “Strang nach Osten” (Q. Ноwe. Ashes of Victory. New York, 1972. P. 55).
On June 8, Halifax expressed a desire to negotiate not by exchanging letters, but at a round table and authorized Seeds to do this, giving him Strang as his assistant. On this occasion, in a speech on July 23, Lloyd George said: “Lord Halifax visited Hitler and Goering. Chamberlain went into the arms of the Fuehrer three times in a row… Why was only a Foreign Office official sent to represent us in a much more powerful country that offers us its help? There is only one answer to this. Mr. Neuville Chamberlain, Lord Halifax and Sir Simon do not want an alliance with Russia” (W. and Z. Coates. A History of Anglo-Soviet Relations. London, 1945. P. 614.).
The main method of diplomatic sabotage of negotiations with the USSR, the Western powers at this stage chose the discussion organized by them on security guarantees to the Baltic states.
The firm resolve of the Soviet Union to defend the Baltic republics from aggression was of no small importance. The USSR was well aware of the ways and methods used by Germany to implement its aggressive plans and the anti-Soviet position of the governments of the Baltic countries. In connection with the seizure of the Klaipeda region from Lithuania by the Nazis, the Soviet government turned to the governments of Estonia and Latvia with statements in which it warned the latter against concluding agreements that could, to one degree or another, infringe upon their independence, and allow them to have the political and economic domination of a third state. It emphasized the danger of such agreements for the Baltic states and their incompatibility with the treaties of Estonia and Latvia with the Soviet Union, which in this case it cannot remain an indifferent spectator. (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 282–283).
Consultations were held with representatives of the Baltic states. The Estonian envoy in Moscow said that his country only formally treats both groups in the same way, but in fact counts on the help of non-aggressive countries, and first of all the USSR (ibid., p. 436). However, such evasive statements were contradicted by a pronounced anti-Soviet policy. At the height of the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations, Estonia and Latvia concluded “friendly” non-aggression pacts with Germany. The chief of the general staff of the German ground forces, Halder, and the chief of Hitler’s military intelligence, Admiral Canaris, who secretly visited these countries, discussed the issue of the occupation of the Baltic by German fascist troops.
Earlier, the German envoy to Estonia, Frowein, reporting to Berlin about a conversation with the chief of staff of the Estonian army, Reck, wrote that it was very important for this country to know whether Germany would exercise control over the Baltic Sea in case of war. “General Rack acknowledged this,” he continued, “and said that Estonia could also help in this matter. For example, the Gulf of Finland is very easy to mine against Soviet warships without attracting any attention. There are other possibilities” (ADAP. Serie D, Bd. V. P. 384.). Finland also took a pro-German position.
On June 15, Seeds handed over to the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs the next proposals of his government, which were not much different from the previous ones. The new draft article 1 read:
“The United Kingdom, France and the USSR undertake to provide each other immediately with all possible support and assistance if one of the countries is drawn into a military conflict with any European power as a result of either
1) aggression on the part of this power against one of these three countries, either
2) aggression on the part of this power against another European state, to which the interested contracting country undertook, in accordance with the wishes of this state, to help against such aggression, either
3) actions on the part of that Power, which the three contracting governments, as a result of mutual consultation provided for in Article III, would recognize as threatening the independence or neutrality of another European state in such a way as to constitute a threat to the security of the contracting country concerned” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 450–451).
This project testified that the British government continued to impede the solution of the issue of providing the Baltic states with effective guarantees from the three powers — the USSR, France and England. This was the real trap set for the Soviet Union by the governments of England and France.
If the Soviet Union was to immediately, automatically come to the aid of England and France in the event of a German attack on Belgium, Greece, Poland, Romania and Turkey, then in the event of a German attack on the Baltic countries, immediate assistance from England and France was not provided. They pledged to come to the rescue only on the condition that “as a result of mutual consultation” Germany’s actions were recognized as threatening the independence and neutrality of the Baltic states, as well as if it constituted a threat to the security of the USSR.
But what if France and England, under some pretext, do not recognize Germany’s actions as falling under these conditions? If they drag out consultations or lead them to a dead end, while Hitler’s troops are already on the offensive? It is enough just to raise these questions to make sure that the proposed project did not impose any real obligations to provide assistance to the Baltic states on England and France (М. Панкратова, В. Сиполс. Почему не удалось предотвратить войну. С. 60–61).
Criticizing the position of the governments of the Western powers, AA Zhdanov, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), pointed out in the pages of the newspaper Pravda that the British and French governments pile up artificial difficulties in the negotiations on such issues that, with their good will and sincere intentions, could be resolved without delay or hindrance.
The negotiations had already lasted 75 days, of which 59 were spent on delays by the Anglo-French side. The British and the French, Zhdanov wrote, “do not want such a treaty with the USSR, which is based on the principle of equality and reciprocity, although they daily take oaths that they are for “equality”, but such an agreement in which the USSR would act as a farm laborer the whole weight of obligations. But no self-respecting country will agree to such an agreement if it does not want to be a toy in the hands of people who like to pull somebody’s chestnuts out of the fire. Moreover, the USSR cannot agree to such a treaty, the strength, power and dignity of which are known to the whole world” («Правда», 29 июня 1939 г.).
Despite the invariably constructive initiative of the Soviet government, the subsequent actions of the Anglo-French side created more and more obstacles in the path of negotiations. One of them was the question of guarantees against indirect aggression, that is, seizure covered by any screen, as happened with Czechoslovakia.
In early June, the question of the need for guarantees against indirect aggression was raised by Daladier. This reflected France’s desire to secure its borders in the east. Daladier proposed to extend the mutual obligations of England, France and the USSR in the event of not only direct but also indirect aggression (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 434). The Soviet government was sympathetic to the opinion of the French Prime Minister. It considered guarantees against indirect aggression as an important and inalienable condition of a tripartite treaty, providing it with the necessary reliability. Such guarantees were of particular importance to the Soviet Union. On the basis of a mutual agreement between Britain, France and the USSR, it was necessary to exclude the possibility of using the territory of the Baltic countries under the guise of “voluntary consent” of their governments as a springboard for Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union.
However, in the course of further negotiations it became clear that Britain and France were trying to push through a definition of indirect aggression, which not only did not guarantee joint actions of the three powers, but also opened a direct path to repeated repetition of the “Czechoslovak variant.” Thus, the invader was shown the ways and means of advancing to the east, and also ensured the neutrality of England and France.
“… The expression “indirect aggression”, — emphasized in the proposals of the Soviet government of July 9, 1939, — refers to an action to which any of the above states agrees under the threat of force from another power or without such a threat and which entails the use of the territory and forces of a given state for aggression against it or against one of the contracting parties, — therefore, entails the loss of this state of its independence or violation of its neutrality” (ibid., pp. 486–487).
The Anglo-French side stubbornly refused to accept a clear and precise definition of indirect aggression. A number of other fundamental issues remained unresolved, including the question of the timing of the entry into force of the military agreement.
The Soviet side proposed that agreements on political and military issues should come into effect simultaneously. Britain and France promised that after the conclusion of a treaty of mutual assistance, negotiations on a military convention would begin. The Soviet government had every reason to express mistrust: a convincing warning was the fate of the Franco-Soviet mutual assistance treaty, which was not backed up by a military agreement and, for this reason alone, did not have the required effectiveness.
Halifax instructed Seeds that the British government was unwilling to accept Soviet proposals to define indirect aggression and simultaneously enter into force of political and military agreements. Informing about the “intention of His Majesty’s government” in case the USSR defends its proposals, “to reconsider the position as a whole” (DBFP. Third series, vol. VI. P. 335–336), that is, to disrupt the negotiations, the minister, in fact, he advised the ambassador to resort to threats and blackmail against the Soviet Union. However, the French government did not support Halifax’s intentions. (История дипломатии, т. III. Дипломатия на первом этапе общего кризиса капиталистической системы. С. 782).
Meanwhile, the Moscow negotiations, directly or indirectly, involved the entire world diplomacy in their orbit. It was clear that this was the last line that could block the path of a new world war. “Now there was only one way to avoid war,” admits B. Liddell Garth, “is to enlist the help of Russia …” (B. Liddell Hart. History of the Second World War. P. 12). But there were no constructive solutions. On one side of the border, the Soviet Union waged a diplomatic struggle, supported by the world progressive community and those Western politicians who soberly assessed the global threat of fascist expansion, on the other — the forces of international reaction, seeking to resolve their contradictions at someone else’s expense.
The leadership of Nazi Germany was extremely alarmed by the possibility of concluding an Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty. In the summer of 1939, Hitler, among his entourage, said that if the negotiations ended successfully, he would be forced to convene a Nazi congress in Nuremberg to review policy and call it a “peace congress” (L. Mоsley. On Borrowed Time. How World War II Began. New York, 1969. P. 256). However, information from London through diplomatic channels convinced the Fuhrer that fears were premature. Exhaustive information about the true intentions of the Western powers flocked to Berlin. In this respect, an excerpt from the telegram of the German ambassador in London of April 26, 1939 is characteristic: “… tonight or tomorrow morning the British government, through its ambassador in Moscow, will give the Soviet government an answer to the counter-proposals of Soviet Russia. The answer is tantamount to rejection, although it is clothed in the form of comments. In its main part, the note contains the rejection of the tripartite pact on mutual assistance proposed by Soviet Russia … Accordingly, military agreements in addition to this pact are also dropped.” (ADAP. Serie D, Bd. VI. P. 279).
A negative position regarding the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations, and above all assistance to the USSR, was taken partly under the influence of England and France by the Polish and Romanian governments, which in foreign policy, even under the direct threat from Germany, did not change their anti-Soviet course. “The Polish government,” Halifax wrote in a memorandum dated May 22, 1939, “does not want to bind itself in this way [(by the Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement)] with the Soviet government. We found out that the Romanian government shares this point of view.” (PRO. Cab., 24/287. P. 75.).
The position of the Polish government has always been a stumbling block in the negotiations. The USSR’s consent to provide assistance to Poland and the negative attitude of its government to cooperation with the Soviet Union in defense against aggression was clearly manifested during the visit to Warsaw of the Deputy People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Potemkin in May 1939. In a conversation with Polish Foreign Minister Beck, he stressed that «The USSR would not refuse to help Poland, if she so wished» (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 389).
But the next day, the Polish ambassador to Moscow made a statement to the People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs that Poland did not want at the moment to bind itself with any agreement with the USSR (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 394.). Beck telegraphed to the Polish ambassador in London on June 9, 1939 that an agreement with the Soviet Union would violate “stabilization and security in Eastern Europe.” (М. Станевич. Сентябрьская катастрофа. Перевод с польского. М. 1953. С. 216). Colonel Beck, testifies the French historian M. Muren, “because of his Russophobia and fear of communism” did not want rapprochement with Soviet Russia and believed that with the Hitler regime it was possible to find a solution to issues in the interests of Poland (М. Моurin. Les relations franco-sovietiques (1917–1939). Paris, 1967. P. 236).
Recklessly rejecting Soviet aid in the struggle against aggression, the rulers of bourgeois-landlord Poland actually put the country in a difficult position and in the event of a war, they knowingly doomed to catastrophe. Just in the days when Beck was sending telegrams to his ambassadors about Poland’s refusal to accept Soviet aid, in the higher spheres of London, Paris and Washington, plans for a “new Munich” were developed and refined — at the expense of Poland. The American Chargé d’Affaires in France reported to the Department of State on June 24: “In influential circles, the opinion prevails that after all of France, all of Central and Eastern Europe should be abandoned in favor of Germany in the hope that in the end Germany will enter into conflict with the Soviet Union.” (FRUS. 1939, vol. I. P. 194).
The policy of the government of the United States of America was of no small importance for the course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations. The version of bourgeois historians that all US statesmen acted to prevent aggression is far from the truth. The negative point of view of the United States was invariably scrupulously brought to the attention of the British cabinet and used by it to reinforce the positions of the opponents of the treaty. American foreign politicians, aware of the sentiments of each member of the British government, skillfully speculated on their anti-Sovietism, in every possible way fanning the false version that the treaty was beneficial only to the USSR. At a cabinet meeting in June 1939, Halifax emphasized that, according to Bullitt, “the Russians need an agreement with us, and we should not conclude it.” (PRO. Cab., 23/99. P. 303). The negative attitude of American diplomacy to the Anglo-Franco-Soviet treaty on mutual assistance was also explained by the fear that such an agreement would strengthen the international positions of England and France, and, consequently, complicate the United States’ struggle for world hegemony (At the same time, reactionary diplomacy did its best to achieve American-German US Ambassador to England J. Kennedy, in conversations with German Ambassador Dirksen after the Munich Agreement, repeatedly emphasized the average American’s sympathy for the German, which “surpasses the American’s sense of friendship for the average Englishman.” (ADAP. Serie D, Bd. IV. P. 559)).
Despite opposition to the negotiations on the part of governments and reactionary forces of a number of countries, the center of determined resistance to the Anglo-Franco-Soviet agreement was in England. Even the English bourgeois historiography does not deny this fact. “The British,” writes R. Parkinson, “made every effort to isolate Russia” (R. Parkinson. The Origins of World War Two. New York, 1970. P. 106–107). It was precisely the Cliveden clique, which expressed the interests of British monopoly capital, and its protégés, Chamberlain and Halifax, who held in their hands the key positions on which the success or failure of the negotiations depended.
In this regard, it is necessary to refute the speculations of some bourgeois historians about “Chamberlain’s lack of firmness”, “Halifax’s inconsistency” and other versions aimed at removing responsibility for delays in the negotiations from the British ruling circles at any cost. Chamberlain, Halifax, Wilson, Hoare and their inner circle, empowered by monopoly capital, very consistently pursued a course of using negotiations for the purpose of monopoly capital, skillfully disorienting the British people and world public opinion.
During March — July 1939, the British cabinet repeatedly discussed the course of the Moscow negotiations, but neither Chamberlain nor Halifax said a word in support of the trilateral agreement. Essentially, cabinet members were playing a game of negotiation. Under the guise of discussing disagreements, various ways were sought for delaying and then disrupting the negotiations in such a way as to place the blame on the USSR. When considering a possible variant of a treaty with the Soviet Union, the British leaders unequivocally stated their intention in the event of an attack by Germany on the USSR to refuse to fulfill the treaty, that is, to leave the Soviet state alone with the fascist coalition. Directing the members of the cabinet on this, Halifax said on June 21: “If the Russian government decides to make our country fight for fantastic goals, common sense will manifest itself.” (PRO. Cab., 23/100. P. 5).
At one of the meetings of the cabinet, Chamberlain said, as recorded in the minutes, that “everything concerning the alliance with Russia, he considers with a great presentiment of trouble”, absolutely does not believe in “the strength of Russia and doubts its ability to provide assistance in case of war.” (PRO. Cab., 23/99. P. 275–276). He called the treaty with the USSR “a stone around the neck”, which “can hang for many years and lead to the fact that even sons will have to fight for Russian interests.” (Ibid. P. 277). Obedient ministers echoed him. Lord Chatfield, Secretary of Defense Coordination, “expressed the hope that colleagues will understand with what disgust he has to consider the possibility of an alliance with the Soviets (PRO. Cab., 24/286. P. 309).
In mid-July, due to the fault of the Anglo-French side, the negotiations reached an impasse. The British representatives in Moscow, in their report to Halifax, replete with anti-Soviet fabrications, were nevertheless forced to admit that the proposals of the USSR were “imbued with sincerity,” and the “magnificent” arguments that you supply us with make almost no impression, “for the USSR sees“ differences in positions of the parties ”, therefore the negotiations as a whole“ turned into a humiliating occupation ”. “From time to time,” said this secret report, “we take a new position, and then we abandon it… The pile-up of one difficulty on another creates the impression that our plans are not serious.” Emphasizing that public opinion “demands the fastest conclusion of a treaty,” British representatives hinted that the decision of the question of whether to continue the tactic of procrastination or finally disrupt negotiations “belongs to the sphere of higher politics,” that is, to the competence of the government (PRO. Cab., 24/288. P. 163–165).
In July 1939, the leader of the British Communists H. Pollit emphasized: “87 percent of the British population wants to conclude a pact with the Soviet Union. Why? Because they first of all want to prevent a war and understand that this can be achieved most effectively by joining forces with the forces of a great and powerful country, which has repeatedly shown in the last troubled years that it has no warlike plans and that it is sincerely ready come to the aid of your allies, who have concluded a collective security treaty with her, if they are attacked by rabid fascist dogs” (Г. Поллит. Избранные статьи и речи (1919–1939). Перевод с английского. Москва., 1955. С. 345).
2. The Military Negotiations
Under these conditions, on July 25, the Anglo-French side was forced, in response to Soviet proposals, to announce its agreement to begin military negotiations. In Moscow, from August 12 to 21, 1939, negotiations were held between military delegations (military missions) of the USSR, England and France, which, as the Soviet government hoped, would lead to the conclusion of a trilateral agreement.
On August 2, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), having discussed the issue of military negotiations, determined the composition of the Soviet delegation (История Коммунистической партии Советского Союза. Т. 5. Кн. 1. М., 1970. С. 70). It included People’s Commissar of Defense Marshal of the Soviet Union K.E. Voroshilov (head of the delegation), Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, 1st Rank Army Commander B.M. Shaposhnikov, People’s Commissar of the Navy, 2nd Rank Fleet flagman N.G. Kuznetsov, Chief of the Military — Air Forces of the Red Army commander of the 2nd rank A. D. Loktionov and deputy chief of the General Staff of the Red Army corps commander I. V. Smorodinov.
The next day, the USSR People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs informed the British and French embassies about the composition of the USSR delegation. The authority of the head and members of the delegation served as an important indicator of the attitude of the Soviet government not only to the upcoming negotiations, but also to the countries that took part in them. The French military attaché in the USSR reported to Paris on August 7: “The fact that this mission includes the People’s Commissar of Defense of the USSR and the People’s Commissar of the Navy, the chief of staff and his deputy and the commander of Soviet aviation shows all the importance that the Soviet the government attaches to these negotiations” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 696).
The governments of England and France showed a other approach to the selection of the composition of their delegations. Admiral R. Drake, close to the royal court, was appointed head of the British delegation. A fellow-thinker of Chamberlain, he gained fame by publicly calling for war against the USSR. The delegation, in addition, included low-influential figures of the British army, Air Marshal C. Vernet, Major General T. Heywood, as well as a number of even less significant persons. Describing the members of the British delegation, the American historian W. Shearer writes that “Drake … according to his data, was absolutely incapable of conducting negotiations at a high level with the Russians, whom he considered aliens from another planet… Vernet did not understand anything either in matters of grand strategy or in diplomacy …” (W. Shirеr. The Collapse of the Third Republic. An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. New York, 1969. P. 448).
The composition of the British delegation testified to Britain’s demonstrative disrespect for the Soviet Union and its apparent disinterest in the effectiveness of the negotiations. Far from sympathizing with the Soviet Union, W. Strang was forced to emphasize in his letter to Halifax that an authoritative person must be sent to Moscow for negotiations between military delegations. “The Russians expect the same attitude towards themselves as towards the French, and certainly not worse than towards the Poles.” Considering that Ironside’s visit to Warsaw was reported in the press, “The Soviet government will consider it an insult if we send a representative of a lower rank.” (PRO. Cab., 24/288. P. 165). (On July 17–19, 1939, the English General Ironside, later Chief of the Imperial General Staff, was in Poland).
The French military delegation included a member of the Supreme Military Council, General J. Dumenc, General M. Valen, teacher of the naval school, Captain 1st Rank Vuillaume, Captain A. Beaufre and others. The Soviet plenipotentiary envoy to France reported to Moscow about the composition of the mission that “the selection of mainly narrow specialists testifies to the inspection goals of the delegation — the intention, first of all, to get acquainted with the state of our army.” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 697).
The policy of the Western powers and the role that was assigned in it to military negotiations are shedding light by the directives and instructions worked out by the governments of England and France and their military headquarters. On July 26, 1939, in the minutes of the meeting of the British Cabinet, when considering the main tasks of the military delegation, it was said: “Everyone agreed that our representatives should be instructed to negotiate very slowly …” (ibid.). The position of the British government was also reflected in the directive of the military delegation: “The British government does not wish to assume any specific obligations that could tie our hands under any circumstances. Therefore, one should strive to limit the military agreement to the most general terms possible. Something like an agreed policy declaration would be quite consistent with this.” Further, the directive disclosed the position of the Western allies in relation to Poland, Romania and the Baltic countries: “If the Russians propose to the British and French governments to turn to Poland, Romania or the Baltic states with proposals that would entail cooperation with the Soviet government or the General Staff, the delegation should not take undertake any obligations … and discuss the issue of the defense of the Baltic states, since neither Great Britain nor France gave them any guarantees” (DBFP. Third series, vol. VI. P. 763–764).
The French delegation was oriented in the same way. Colonial Minister J. Mandel had information that “the mission was leaving for Moscow without a developed plan.” “This alarms and undermines confidence in the solidity of the negotiations,” the USSR plenipotentiary envoy to France telegraphed to Moscow on August 3, “… The reasons for all this lie in the fact that here [(in Paris)] and in London there is still no hope of reaching agreement with Berlin” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 526.).
The instruction drawn up by the French General Staff resembled an academic discussion bulletin (А. Веaufrе. Le drame de 1940. P. 120–121). “Cooperation with the Russians,” later wrote a member of the French delegation, Beaufre, “was seen in it as an auxiliary factor that should be used in the interests of problems closer to our diplomacy and strategy …” (A. Beaufre. Le drame de 1940. P. 123).
The main task of the military missions sent by the governments of England and France was unchanged. “It is not in our interests,” the note from the French General Staff said frankly, “to leave it [(USSR)] out of the conflict.” (АВП, ф. 48з, oп. 38, п. 1, д. 5, л. 240).
The military negotiations also pursued other goals. They are evidenced by a special questionnaire presented to members of the military missions of the Western powers. The British and French general staffs of their delegations, which were invited to act in unity, were given the task of finding out in detail the size and condition of the USSR Armed Forces, setting the possible terms for their mobilization and concentration, and familiarizing themselves with the strategic considerations of the Soviet command regarding the plans for waging war.
Here are some of the questions:
What is the main idea of the USSR’s policy in waging war?
What are the views of the Soviet General Staff on German and Italian strategy at the beginning of the war and at its subsequent stages?
If Germany attacks in the East, what defensive operations can the USSR undertake: a) in Poland, b) in Romania? To what reach and on what lines is the Soviet Union ready to use its army or air force outside the Polish-Russian and Romanian-Russian borders?
Will Soviet bombers be able to operate against Germany directly from the territory of the USSR, or will they have to be based in Poland and Romania?
How much refined oil could the USSR have supplied during the war? Will it have enough tankers to transport it?
What naval policy does the Soviet Union intend to adhere to in the Baltic and the White Sea? How can he act against the German merchant fleet or the transport of German troops by sea in these zones?
What are the specifications of aviation gasoline in the USSR? (ibid., pp. 28–63).
The German ambassador in London, Dirksen, who was aware of the mood of British government circles, reported to Berlin that “the military mission has more its task to establish the combat capability of the Soviet Army than to conclude operational agreements.” (Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны, т. II. С. 117).
In an effort to scout as fully as possible the state of the military potential of the Soviet Union, the Anglo-French delegation was by no means going to initiate it into their true intentions. The strictly secret instruction received by the British and French missions from Chamberlain and Daladier directly stated: “Negotiate very slowly. The Mission must exercise the greatest restraint where these considerations [(set out above)] reveal Franco-British intentions. “ (П. Жилин. Как фашистская Германия готовила нападение на Советский Союз (Расчеты и просчеты). М., 1966. С. 36).
The unwillingness of Britain and France to achieve cooperation with the USSR in the fight against aggression was also evidenced by the unprecedented delay in the arrival of military missions in the Soviet Union, which lasted seventeen days. And this at a time when Europe was already in a state of pre-war crisis, when the war could start at any moment.
The following conversation took place between the Soviet plenipotentiary in England Maisky and Admiral Drax:
“- Tell me, Admiral, when are you leaving for Moscow?
- It has not yet been finally decided, but in the coming days.
- You, of course, fly … the atmosphere in Europe is tense …
- Oh, no! .. It is inconvenient to fly on an airplane!
- Maybe you will go to the Soviet Union on one of your fast cruisers? .. It would be very stylish and impressive …
- No, and the cruiser is not good … “ (И. Майский. Воспоминания советского дипломата. С. 383–384).
Finally, on August 5, the slow-speed City of Exeter packet boat (its speed did not exceed 13 knots), on board which there were delegations, departed from the pier and headed for Leningrad.
The work of the meeting of military delegations began with the presentation of credentials approved by the governments. Voroshilov, who chaired the meeting, read out the text of the authority issued by the Council of People’s Commissars of the USSR, which stated that the delegation “is authorized to negotiate with the British and French military missions and sign a military convention on the organization of military defense of England, France and the USSR against aggression in Europe” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 536.).
The credentials of the French delegation stated that General Dumenc was authorized to negotiate with the main command of the Soviet Armed Forces “on all issues related to entering into cooperation between the armed forces of both countries” (ibid., P. 546). It followed that the French delegation had the authority to negotiate. The British delegation had no written authority.
On this occasion, the following dialogue took place between the heads of the Soviet and British delegations:
“Marshal K. E. Voroshilov: … But the authority, in my opinion, is necessary in writing so that it is mutually visible to what extent you are authorized to negotiate, what issues you can touch upon, to what extent you can discuss these questions and how these negotiations can end. Our powers, as you have seen, are all-encompassing … Your verbal powers are not entirely clear to me. In any case, it seems to me that this question is not idle — at the very beginning it determines the order and form of our negotiations …
… Admiral Drake declares that if it was convenient to transfer the negotiations to London, then he would have all the powers …
Marshal KE Voroshilov remarks amid general laughter that it is easier to bring papers from London to Moscow than to go to London for such a large company” (ibid., Pp. 545–546).
So, already on the first day of the meetings, the declared intentions of the British and French governments to conclude a military convention, and therefore the trilateral treaty as a whole, were again questioned by their representatives.
The Soviet delegation proposed a concrete military plan, the implementation of which guaranteed the suppression of German aggression. Chief of the General Staff Shaposhnikov outlined a plan for the deployment of the Soviet Armed Forces on the western borders of the USSR.
In accordance with this plan, in the event of aggression in Europe, the Soviet Army was ready to deploy 120 infantry and 16 cavalry divisions, 5 thousand heavy guns, 9–10 thousand tanks, from 5 to 5.5 thousand combat aircraft (this number is not included parts of fortified areas, air defense and coastal protection.). Fortified areas along the entire western border of the USSR will put on alert within four to six hours, and the army was concentrated within eight to twenty days.
The military plan of the General Staff of the Red Army provided for the following options for joint actions of the armed forces of England, France and the USSR.
The first option is when the bloc of aggressors’ attacks England and France. In this case, the USSR will deploy 70 % of the armed forces that will be directly directed by Britain and France against the main aggressor — Germany. If these two countries put up 90 infantry divisions against the fascist German troops, then the Soviet Union — 63 infantry and 6 cavalry divisions with a corresponding number of artilleries, tanks and aircraft with a total number of about 2 million people.
With this option, Poland’s participation is considered mandatory by virtue of the treaty with Britain and France with all its forces, while it should concentrate from 40 to 45 infantry divisions for the main attack on its western borders and against East Prussia. In addition, the British and French governments must obtain consent from Poland for the passage and actions of the USSR armed forces — land and air — through the Vilna corridor and, if possible, through Lithuania — to the borders of East Prussia, and if the situation requires, then through Galicia.
The combined Anglo-French fleet was entrusted with: closing the English Channel and breaking through a strong squadron into the Baltic Sea for operations against the German fleet; with the consent of the Baltic countries, the temporary occupation of the Moonsund archipelago, the Aland Islands, the ports of the Ganges, Pernov, Gapsal, Gaynash and Libava for the purpose of protection the neutrality and independence of the Baltic countries from an attack from Germany, the termination of the supply of ore and other raw materials to Germany from Sweden, the blockade of the Reich shores in the North Sea, domination in the Mediterranean Sea, the closure of the Suez Canal and the Dardanelles.
The USSR Navy, together with the Anglo-French squadron, should conduct cruising operations in the North off the coast of Finland and Norway (outside their territorial waters) against the aggressor’s submarine and surface fleet; in the Baltic to be based together with the combined fleet of England and France on the Ganges, Aland Islands and the Moonsund archipelago, as well as to Hapsal, Pernov, Gainash and Libava for the protection of the independent Baltic countries. The Baltic Fleet of the USSR will also develop its cruising operations, submarine operations, plant mines off the coast of East Prussia and Pomerania, and prevent the supply of industrial raw materials from Sweden to Germany.
The second option is when the aggression will be directed at Poland and Romania. These two states must send all their armed forces to the front. France and England immediately declare war on Germany and oppose her. The participation of the USSR in the war can be carried out only on condition that Britain and France reach an agreement on the passage of Soviet troops through the Vilna corridor, Galicia and Romania. In this case, the Soviet Union is putting up the same number of divisions against Germany as Britain and France. The British, French and Soviet navies face the same tasks as in the first version. The Black Sea Fleet of the USSR closes the mouth of the Danube and the Bosphorus from the penetration of enemy surface and submarine forces into the Black Sea.
The third option is when Germany, using the territory of Finland, Estonia and Latvia, directs aggression against the USSR. In this case, France and England must immediately go to war with Germany or the bloc of aggressors, deploy 70 percent of the forces and assets deployed by the Soviet Union and immediately begin active actions against the main aggressor. Poland necessarily opposes Germany, allocating at least 45 infantry divisions, reinforced with artillery, tanks and aircraft, and allows Soviet troops to pass through the Vilna corridor and Galicia. If Romania is drawn into the war, it must participate in it with all its might and let Soviet troops pass through its territory (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 574–577).
These were the general strategic considerations of the Soviet military delegation on joint actions by the armed forces of Britain, France and the USSR in the fight against the German aggressor, arising from the real military-political situation.
The British and French delegations continued to conduct abstract discussions and were by no means going to agree on the organization of a joint rebuff to the aggressor. Draque expounded common truths, such as those that it is necessary to “cut off all communication routes to the enemy”, “to find and defeat the enemy’s fleet” and others. The British and French military missions did not even have a preliminary plan for joint operations against a common enemy. This further intensified the doubts of the Soviet government about the true aims of the British and French delegations.
Reviews of the state of their armed forces, with which the British and French representatives spoke, were of a general nature and, as it turned out later, sometimes contained false information. So, Dumenk said that if the Nazis sent their main forces to the eastern front, they would have to leave at least 40 divisions against France. In this case, General Gamelin will attack the Germans with all his might (ibid., P. 554). Meanwhile, Dumenk, as a member of the Supreme Military Council, was well aware that the military doctrine of France and its strategic plans for waging war on the western front were passively defensive in nature. In May 1939, at the Paris meeting of Anglo-French military representatives, when discussing issues related to the fulfillment of obligations to provide assistance to Poland in the event of German aggression, France stated unequivocally that it was not going to take active actions on the western front (PRO. Cab., 23 / 99. P. 294). The same spirit of passivity pervaded Gamelin’s directive to conduct an operation between the Rhine and Moselle, directed on May 31, 1939, to General Georges. “At the first stage,” it said, “in the event of occupation, it is necessary to drive out the enemy from the national territory, then enter into contact with his defensive zone, simultaneously covering the main part of our territory in depth … At the second stage, starting from the moment of entry into contact with the defensive position of the enemy, it is necessary to identify the location of the German units, which, taking into account our available funds, will subsequently should be to striked” (M. Gamelin. Servir. Le prologue du drame. P. 426–427). As you can see, the blow to the enemy was postponed for an indefinite future, and there was no orientation towards an offensive “with all our might” at all. England followed a similar strategy. The directives to the military missions indicated that “the actions of the British and French armed forces in the West will [only] bind the German forces on this front. As soon as the allied forces have the necessary resources, they will launch an offensive, most likely against Italy” (DBFP. Third series, vol. VI. P. 774).
The British and French delegations deliberately disorientated the Soviet representatives. They knew that the strategic plans of their governments did not provide for active actions against Germany on the western front, and at the same time demanded that the USSR declare war on Germany in the event of an attack on Poland, but did not take decisive measures until the Wehrmacht troops reached the Soviet borders. In other words, an unhindered path was opened for the Reich to aggression against Poland, Romania and further against the USSR.
The missions of the Western powers acted in strict accordance with the instructions received, which said that, having an enemy in the person of the USSR, Germany would find herself in the East in much more difficult conditions. At the same time, the depth of the front will increase indefinitely, and the Reich will not be able to hope that it will easily get away with the occupation of Romania and a large part of Poland. The further German troops penetrate into enemy territory, the closer they will be to the Soviet Union. (АВП, ф. 48з, оп. 38, п .1, д. 6, л. 276).
The desire of the Western powers to expose the USSR under attack became evident during the discussion of the cardinal issue of the passage of Soviet troops through the territory of Poland and Romania in the event of German aggression. This question was not new. It was already on the agenda in 1938.
Nevertheless, when on August 14 Voroshilov invited Draks and Dumenk to clarify their point of view on this issue, the British and French delegations promised to seek the opinion of their governments. But even without this, it was quite clear that, having sent delegations to negotiations without first resolving the most important issue defining the strategic interaction of the parties to the treaty in the struggle against a common enemy, the ruling circles of England and France did not strive for genuine cooperation with the USSR.
3. Anglo-French negotiations with Nazi Germany
Only after the Second World War was the cunning of the Western powers fully revealed, which used the Moscow negotiations as a means of putting pressure on Nazzy Germany in their own interests and behind the back of the USSR from May to the end of August 1939 they negotiated with the Nazis.
England was the initiator of these negotiations. On her part, at various stages, they were attended by: Chamberlain, Halifax, Chamberlain’s closest adviser Wilson, Foreign Trade Minister Hudson, representatives of the Party leadership Ball — from the Conservatives and Buxton — from Labor, Parliamentary Deputy Foreign Minister Butler, British Air Force command officer Ropp; on the German side — the German ambassador in London Dirksen, his adviser Kordt, the government official at special assignments Wohltat, as well as a number of others. The role of mediators between Hitler and Goering, on the one hand, and the Chamberlain government, on the other, were performed by the Swedish industrialist Dahlerus, the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig Burckhardt, and the German diplomat A. Trott zu Solz.
The negotiations were based on the idea of concluding a new “pact of four” (England, France, Germany and Italy) or, if difficulties arise on this path (negotiations took place without the active participation of France and Italy), a bilateral Anglo-German alliance. In the event of a lucrative imperialist deal with Germany (under the guise of a “non-aggression pact” and “non-intervention pact”), Britain expressed its readiness to end negotiations with the USSR, to renounce guarantees given to Poland and other countries, and even to sacrifice the interests of its closest ally, France.
A prominent figure in the Conservative Party, Member of Parliament Drummond-Wolff, in a conversation with German Foreign Ministry official Ruther, held on May 14, 1939 in Berlin, unambiguously stated that “the political combinations that Great Britain is now going to make” presuppose the readiness to provide Germany “as rightfully belongs its” the field of economic activity “throughout the world, in particular in the East and the Balkans”. Drummond-Wolff promised Germany a large loan for the proposed “political combination” (rumors was spread about a fantastic sum of 1 billion pounds sterling). Chamberlain’s new “political combination” clearly revealed a plan for dividing the world into spheres of influence: the Anglo-Saxon in the West and the Germanic in the East.
Almost a month after this conversation, negotiations at a higher level took place in London, in which Wilson and Hudson participated on the British side, and Woltat on the German side. On these days, June 8, 1939, Chamberlain met with Trott. British politicians made it clear to their German interlocutors that they were ready to continue the Munich policy and give Germany a free hand in Eastern Europe (DGFP. Series D, vol. VI. P. 681–682; S. Aster. 1939. The Making of the Second World War. London, 1973. P. 239).
Evidence of a certain rapprochement of the sides’ points of view can be seen in the speech of Halifax on June 29, 1939, who expressed his readiness to come to an agreement with Germany on issues that, in his opinion, “give the world anxiety”: , trade barriers, “living space”, the limitation of weapons and much more that affects Europeans “(Speeches on International Policy by Lord Halifax. Oxford, 1940. P. 296).
Woltat visited London a second time and negotiations resumed. Hitler’s plan to divide the world into spheres of influence was reinforced by the British proposal for “cooperation” with Germany in three regions of the world: in the British Empire, China and Russia. (Документы и материалы кануна второй мировой войны, т. II. C. 70–71).
Thus, among the territories to be divided, the British side named China and the Soviet Union, with which Great Britain was at that time negotiating a joint struggle against fascist aggression.
The policy of collusion with the Nazis was actively supported by the Labor leaders. One of them, Buxton, who at the end of June 1939 visited the German embassy in London, bluntly spoke out in favor of delimiting the spheres of influence between England and Germany. At the same time, he said that if Germany pledges not to interfere in the affairs of the British Empire, then England will agree to respect the interests of the Reich in Eastern and Southeastern Europe, refuse guarantees to some countries, influence France in order to break her agreement on mutual assistance with USSR and will end negotiations with the Soviet Union. Not confining himself to a conversation in London, Buxton went to Berlin in mid-1939 as the Labor Party’s foreign policy expert. After visiting the German Foreign Office official Hetzler, he presented him in writing with his proposals, which said that, under certain conditions, England would agree “to recognize Eastern Europe as the natural living space of Germany” (DGFP. Series D, vol. Vir. P. 98–99), and also hand over Poland to the Nazis.
Buxton’s visit to Berlin was the prelude to the final round of secret talks that began in August. Now they were joined by Dahlerus and Burckhardt, who had direct contact with Hitler and Goering. It was they who were supposed to complete an agreement in principle on major foreign policy issues and prepare the trip of the Nazi leaders to London. The British ambassador to Berlin Henderson, seeking to inflame the ambitions of the Nazi leaders, repeatedly repeated that he hoped at least one day to see “the Fuehrer and Hermann Goering go to Buckingham Palace to pay a visit to the king.” (Л. Мосли. Утраченное время. Сокращенный перевод с английского. М., 1972. С. 305).
По инициативе Далеруса 7 августа в Шлезвиг-Гольштейне состоялась тайная встреча Геринга с английской делегацией, которую возглавлял эмиссар правительства Спенсер. В ходе встречи была достигнута договоренность о проведении конференции четырех держав в Швеции на условиях, что «Германия получит от Польши все, что хочет» (Английские делегаты поодиночке прибыли в Гамбург, а затем на автомашинах под шведским флагом, скрываясь от возможного разоблачения, направились к месту встречи с Герингом
On the initiative of Dahlerus, on August 7 in Schleswig-Holstein, Goering held a secret meeting with the British delegation, led by the government’s emissary Spencer. During the meeting, an agreement was reached to hold a conference of the four powers in Sweden on the conditions that “Germany will get whatever it wants from Poland”. (The British delegates arrived in Hamburg one by one, and then in cars under the Swedish flag, hiding from possible exposure, went to meeting point with Goering (Л. Мосли. Утраченное время. С. 282–284).).
On August 11, Hitler told the High Commissioner of the League of Nations in Danzig Burckhardt that Germany needed a “free hand” in the East, she was ready to live in peace with England and cooperate with her. For his part, Burckhardt assured the Fuehrer that “the Western powers are always ready to negotiate.” He undertook to inform London of Hitler’s readiness to meet with someone from the English government who speaks German, such as General Ironside (DBFP. Third series, vol. VI. P. 693, 695–696). Information about the meeting between Hitler and Burckhardt was leaked to the press. The Soviet plenipotentiary envoy to France telegraphed to Moscow that “Burckhardt’s mission is now in the center of attention,” because everyone who knows him “excludes the possibility that he could undertake his trip without the knowledge and consent of London and Paris.” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 583, 584).
Burckhardt reported the results of the trip to the heads of the British and French Foreign Ministries, who, in turn, reported the results to their governments. Since much became known to the public, Bonnet was forced to invite the Soviet plenipotentiary to “inform” him about Burckhardt’s trip, hiding the true content of these negotiations and their anti-Soviet orientation.
Then military negotiations followed between England and Germany. On August 16, in Berlin, the head of the foreign policy service of Hitler’s party, Rosenberg, met with the representative of the ruling circles of Great Britain, Ropp, who said that at his headquarters and the Ministry of Aviation they considered it absurd that Britain and Germany will throw into a struggle to the death for Poland, and that he and his colleagues, who have studied Germany and the National Socialist movement in detail for many years, do not believe that, even after winning a victory in the East, she thought of crushing England and France. Then Ropp made an important message, which largely explains the subsequent events of the German-Polish war. “Such a variant is possible,” he stressed, “that Germany will quickly end Poland. Although by this time the war [(with England and France)] will be declared, during this period it will be waged by both sides as a defensive … nor would Germany put their own well-being at stake” (ADAP. Serie D, Bd. VII. P. 68–69).
So, like for Czechoslovakia, a crown of thorns was prepared for Poland. In pursuing this betrayal, the reactionary circles of Britain and France hoped that in this way the Hitlerite armies would reach the borders of the USSR. The details of the conspiracy were supposed to be clarified during a personal meeting between Chamberlain and Goering, whose trip to the British Isles, scheduled for August 23, was approved by Hitler (E. Halifax. The life of Lord Halifax by the Earl of Birkenhead. London, 1965, p. 444). All “precautions” were carefully thought out. Goering’s plane was to land at a secluded airfield in Hertfordshire, where representatives of the British government were going to meet it in the strictest confidence. From here the Reichsmarschall was to proceed to Checker, Chamberlain’s country residence. There were already made all the necessary preparations for a secret reception, up to the removal of numerous servants (L. Mosley. Lost Time. P. 306).
Acting insidiously and treacherously, the Western powers made it clear to Hitler by all means that the Soviet state had no allies and Germany could attack Poland, and then the USSR, without risking encountering opposition from Britain and France.
Preparing to receive Goering, England continued the negotiation game in Moscow. The Western powers in every possible way delayed the answer to the cardinal question of the passage of Soviet troops through Poland and Romania. On August 18, the negotiations were interrupted, and then completely stopped, since on August 21 it turned out that no instructions had been received from the governments of England and France, and their military missions again asked for a delay. In an official statement made on this occasion by the Soviet military mission, it was emphasized that it «does not imagine how the governments and general staffs of England and France, sending their missions to the USSR to negotiate the conclusion of a military convention, could not give precise and positive instructions on such an elementary issue as the passage and actions of the Soviet armed forces against the troops of the aggressor on the territory of Poland and Romania, with which Britain and France have appropriate political and military relations.
If, however, the French and the British turning this perfectly clear question into a big problem that requires a long study, then this means that there is every reason to doubt their desire for real and serious military cooperation with the USSR.
In view of the above, the responsibility for delaying military negotiations, as well as for interrupting these negotiations, naturally falls on the French and British sides.» (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 627.).
The French delegation made some attempts to get Poland’s consent to allow Soviet troops to pass through its territory by sending a representative to Warsaw. However, such actions were insincere. The French knew that both the Polish and Romanian governments were negative. According to a fair assessment of the historians of the socialist countries, these governments “did not intend to accept the proposal of the USSR. Their refusal was categorical. In practice, this meant that the conclusion of a military convention was impossible” (Marea conflagratie a secolului XX. Al doilea razboi mondial. P. 76).
The testimony of Beaufre, a participant in the negotiations in Moscow, exposes the desire of some English historians (Butler and others) to place full responsibility for the outbreak of the Second World War on Poland and thus shield the ruling circles of England, and at the same time Nazi Germany. “The problem was not to get the Poles to answer whether they agree or not to let Soviet troops pass through their territory, but to find a loophole that would allow the negotiations to continue.” (А. Веaufrе. Le drame de 1940. P. 156) — he later wrote.
On August 22, 1939, Dumenk announced to the head of the Soviet military mission that he received from his government a positive answer to the “fundamental, cardinal question” and the authority to “sign a military convention.” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 631.).
However, he admitted that he did not know anything about the positions of the British, Polish and Romanian governments (ibid., P. 632). Thus, in reality, there was no answer to the “cardinal question”. This led the negotiations to a dead end. The guilt of the Anglo-French side is obvious.
The reactionary historians of the West countries, trying to remove responsibility from the ruling circles of the Western powers for frustrating the persistent efforts of the USSR, aimed at developing coordinated measures to suppress fascist aggression, put forward a false version that “no one wanted to stop” Hitler (K. Eubank. The Origins of World War II. New York, 1969. P. 30). (Even further, not hiding his anti-Soviet beliefs, goes the British bourgeois historian E. Butler, who, contrary to historical facts, claims that “the communists intended to start a war and therefore continued the policy of procrastination in negotiations with British representatives in Moscow” (E. Butler. The Red Pattern of World Conquest. Is it now too late to defeat Communism? London, 1968. P. 46).). The course of the Moscow talks convincingly testifies that the position of the Soviet Union should have led to unconditional success, if their failure had not been planned in advance by the governments of England, France and the United States.
The policy of connivance on Japanese aggression on the part of Britain and its allies was especially clearly manifested when on July 24 Japanese Foreign Minister Arita and British Ambassador Craigie exchanged legs that formalized an agreement that went down in history as the Arita-Craigie agreement. It has written one of the most shameful pages in the history of English diplomacy. In fact, it was “Munich in the Far East”: China was assigned in Asia the same role of a victim of aggression as Czechoslovakia in Europe. In conditions when Japan was conducting military operations against the USSR and the Mongolian People’s Republic, the Arita-Craigi agreement meant a guarantee (from England) of the safety of Japanese troops in China on the bridgehead from which they acted against the USSR.
Drawing a parallel between the Anglo-German and Anglo-Japanese negotiations, on the one hand, and the Moscow negotiations, on the other, the Soviet envoy to France informed the NKID on July 25, 1939 that “the correctness of our position in the negotiations became especially clear to everyone in the light of of the Hudson-Woltat negotiations and the capitulatory Anglo-Japanese agreement … Any honest supporter of an agreement with us asks himself what kind of confidence Moscow can have in the negotiators when, at the time of negotiations, a bridge is built to an agreement with Germany, and during the military conflict between the USSR and Japan shameful advances are made to Japan” (СССР в борьбе за мир накануне второй мировой войны. Издательство политической литературы. Москва, 1971. С. 516).
It is difficult now to find a sane person who would risk denying the role of the governments of Germany, Japan and Italy in unleashing the Second World War. However, there are still quite a few reactionary authors trying to conceal the guilt of the leading Western countries, whitewash the pre-war policy of the governments of England, France, and the United States, accuse the USSR that the German aggression has not been stopped.
But an objective study of events forces even many Western historians to recognize the true goals of the policy of the Western powers in the pre-war years. K. Ingram, a prominent representative of the liberal-critical trend in British historiography, opposed the identification of the foreign policy of the USSR with the foreign policy of the capitalist countries and stressed that “the peace is natural for the development of the Soviets.” He pointed to the pro-Hitler sympathies of the Chamberlains, who sought to conclude a “gentlemen’s agreement” with the fascist dictators and who considered fascism a lesser evil compared to Bolshevism (K. Ingram. Years of Crisis. An Outline of International History 1919–1945. London, 1946. P. 70, 77).
L. Namier was one of the first bourgeois historians to objectively examine the course of the Anglo-French-Soviet negotiations in Moscow in the summer of 1939. He came to the conclusion that by sending military missions to Moscow, London and Paris were not going to conclude an agreement that could stop Hitler. Military missions were placed in an “absurd position”, and their failure is by no means accidental (L. Namier. Europe in Decay; A Study in Desintegration 1936–1940. London, 1950. P. 119, 158, 258–259). W. Shirer shares his opinion: “It was quite clear that when Germany was preparing to attack Poland, and Italy had already invaded the Balkans, France and England did not seriously think about concluding a military alliance with the USSR against Hitler” (W. Shirer. The Collapse of the Third Republic. An Inquiry into the Fall of France in 1940. P. 425). Outlining Hitler’s plans for the conquest of “living space” B. Liddell Hart wrote: “The later statements of Western statesmen that they knew nothing about these plans do not correspond to reality. In 1937–1938. many of them were very realistic about the situation, but only did so in private conversations, and not in public statements. In British government circles, many supported a political course, the essence of which was that Germany rush to the East” (B. Liddell Hart. History of the Second World War. P. 8).
French politicians, covering the traces of their capitulatory policy before the war, destroyed the diplomatic archives in May 1940. That is why the publication of archival funds preserved in French embassies abroad is of particular value. (Documents diplomatiques francais 1932–1939, 2e serie (1936–1939). T. IV (20 novembre 1936–19 fevrier 1937); T. V (20 fevrier-31 mai 1937). Paris, 1967–1968).
The documents show that the mortal danger that lurked in the plans of the Nazis in relation to France was not a secret for official Paris. Yet the Daladier government continued to seek opportunities for rapprochement with the Nazi Reich.
Of undoubted interest is the documentary report of the parliamentary commission to investigate the reasons for the defeat of France in 1940, the conclusions of which are set out in two volumes with a nine-volume appendix of the testimony of political and military leaders (Les evenements survenus en France de 1933 a 1945. Rapport de M. Charles Serre, depute au nom de la Commission d’enquete parlementaire. T. 1–2; Temoignages et documents, recueillis par la Commission d’enquete parlementaire. Annexes. T. I-IX. Paris, 1947–1951).
However, even here the real reasons for the policy of the French ruling circles, which contributed to the outbreak of World War II and led the country to military defeat, are far from being fully disclosed.
Many contemporary Western authors, especially French ones, condemn the Munich policy and admit that the Soviet Union in the pre-war years resolutely opposed the threat of war, taking a consistent anti-fascist position. Thus, M. Beaumont notes: “The fierce opponents of Nazism, the Soviets, proved to be a powerful factor in the struggle against German aggression. During the Sudeten crisis, their policies were absolutely flawless; they were declaring their readiness to fulfill their obligations to the end” (М. Baumont. La Faillite de la paix (1918–1939). T II. Pans, 1951. P. 861).
A. Noger argues that the balance of forces in 1938 was on the side of England and France, but their ruling circles agreed to a deal in Munich, “fearing to be drawn into the war against Hitler Germany and fascist Italy … on the side of Bolshevik Russia” (H. Nоgueres. Munich ou drole de paix (26 septembre 1938). Paris, 1963. P. 386).
Critically assessing the positions of the Western powers, A. Scherer rightly noted that the ruling circles of England and France sought to resolve their contradictions with Hitler’s Germany at the expense of the Soviet Union, and concluded that the Munich policy of “appeasement” of the aggressor directly led to war («Revue d’histoire de la deuxieme guerre mondiale». Octobre 1958. P. 19, 24).
General A. Bofr sharply condemned the Munich policy. He writes that as a result of Munich, Czechoslovakia became a victim of the aggressor — the soul of the Little Entente, that Chamberlain and Daladier agreed a dismember France’s loyal ally, destroyed the basis of Foch’s strategic concept. By surrendering Czechoslovakia to Hitler, «France lost face in the eyes of her other allies. The Little Entente was destroyed, and the USSR, not allowed to negotiate, was left outside of European politics. The Munich policy of England and France was giving Germany a free hand in the East against the USSR» (A. Beaufre. Memoires (1920–1940–1945). Paris, 1965. P. 103).
Conclusion
The process of the rapid growth of the threat of the Second World War, which took almost four years, consisted of two organically interconnected stages. During the first years, the fascist states — Italy, Japan and Germany — consistently launched military operations in various parts of the world: Ethiopia, Spain, China. The infamous Munich agreement was a decisive event on the way to unleashing a world war. Czechoslovakia was given to be torn apart by the aggressor. The balance of world forces was upset in favor of fascism, and the center of gravity of the imminent global conflict was finally established in the heart of Europe. Under the flag of anti-Sovietism, Hitlerite Germany, together with its allies and with the blessing of the reactionary forces of bourgeois imperialism, liquidated the remnants of the Versailles system and destroyed the links of the European defensive structures. France has lost its allies in Central and Eastern Europe, and has increasingly deviated from the collective measures for the protection of peace agreed with the Soviet Union.
As a result of Munich, fascist Germany, having seized the political initiative, fully believed in impunity for its aggressive actions. At the beginning of 1939, the further course of the military-political strategy of the Reich was clarified.
The lightning-fast occupation of the rest of Czechoslovakia, the Memel region and Albania allowed the fascist bloc led by Germany to dramatically increase its military-economic potential, radically improve the initial strategic positions for the “great German campaign” to world domination.
The myth of the Anglo-French ruling circles that the Munich agreement will provide “peace for a whole generation” has turned into a tragedy for Europe.
In the spring and summer of 1939, the Soviet Union, despite all the hypocrisy and maneuvers of London and Paris, persistently continued to advocate the creation of a collective security system in order to prevent a world war. The more complex the international situation became; his proposals became all the more vital.
The working people, all democratic forces expressed their determination to rebuff the aggressor. However, the imperialists of England and France did not move from the foundations of Munich policy, but only carefully disguised them. Through a series of diplomatic negotiations and demarches with the countries of Eastern and Southeast Europe, they secretly stepped up their activities to direct German aggression to the East.
The culprit for unleashing the Second World War was the system of bourgeois imperialism with its inherent contradictions, conflicts, and acute confrontation in the struggle for world domination.
Note
The text is written based on Англо-франко-советские переговоры и Вероломство правительств Англии и Франции (http://historic.ru/ ‘Всемирная история’)
English quotations are not literally accurate as they are the result of double translation. However, their meaning is preserved. All English quotes in the text of the article have links to the original sources.
